Result states are, broadly speaking,
Result states: a proposal
The interpretation of each of the following sentences appears to involve what may be called a result state: 1 * I wish to thank the organizers of ICSH9 in Debrecen for their invitation to speak at the conference and to the audience for their questions and comments. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the first draft of the paper and to the editors for their efforts. Gyuri (György) Rákosi, in particular, made useful remarks on the near-final draft. Finally, I have benefitted from discussions of the data with Anita Rákóczy and Andrea Velich. 1 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses: ACC = accusative, COMP = complementizer, DAT = dative, ILL = illative, INF = infinitive, PREV = preverb, SUBL = sublative, TERM = terminative, TRAN = translative. The case suffixes -rA 'SUBL' and -vÁ 'TRAN' stand for the pairs -ra/-re and -vá/-vé, respectively, the exact form of the suffix depending on vowel harmony. A centered dot (·) is employed to separate a preverb from its verb if they would be written together according to the rules of Hungarian orthography. All translations from Hungarian are my own.
( In (1a), Tigris was out of sight for five days, and her being gone was the result of her disappearing. In (1b), Rex's being a hero was the result of his turning into one. In (2a), I had the loan from the bank for a year, and my having the loan was the result of my receiving it. Finally, in (2b), all my walls were green, which was the result of my painting them that color.
On the present conception, a result state is inherently a relational notion: a state s is a result state with respect to an event e, an individual x, a two-place relation V , and a two-place relation R just in case V holds of e and x, e causes s, e immediately precedes s, and R holds of s and x. To this we should add a "sanity check" to ensure that no result state of type R with respect to x is attained earlier in e. In other words, e should be the "smallest event" that has a result state of type R with respect to x. 2 (3) result-state(s, e, x,V, R) def = ⊲ result state V (e, x) ∧ cause(e, s) ∧ e ≪ s ∧ R(s, x) ∧ ¬∃e ′ ∃s ′ (e ′ < ini e ∧V (e ′ , x) ∧ cause(e ′ , s
The definition of a result state in (3) covers the case in which V and R are two-place relations. But sometimes we need to handle the case in which these are replaced by three-place relations. A result state ⋆ is like a result state but involves two individuals shared between the event and the state, as defined in (4), where U stands for a relation between events and two individuals and Q, for a relation between states and two individuals.
(4) result-state ⋆ (s, e, x, y,U, Q) def = ⊲ result state ⋆ U (e, x, y) ∧ cause(e, s) ∧ e ≪ s ∧ Q(s, x, y) ∧ ¬∃e ′ ∃s ′ (e ′ < ini e∧U (e ′ , x, y)∧cause(e ′ , s ′ )∧e ′ ≪ s ′ ∧Q(s ′ , x, y)) Finally, for the sake of completeness, a result state • is yet a third variation, the case in which no individual is shared between the event and the state, as defined in (5), where E is a predicate of events and S is a predicate of states. 
E, S))
Returning to (1) and (2), there are two kinds of examples to contend with: (i) where the r-state is overtly expressed (hőssé válik 'turn into a hero', zöldre fest 'paint green'), and (ii) where the r-state is covertly expressed (el·tűnik 'disappear', kap 'receive'). Beginning with the latter, it seems plausible to think of certain verbs as lexically expressing the type of r-state involved:
In prose, el·tűnik 'disappear' denotes the three-place relation between events e, states s, and individuals x such that e is a disappearing of x and e has a result state s in which x is out of sight. 3 Analogously, kap 'receive' denotes the four-place relation between events e, states s, and individuals x and y such that e is a receiving of y by x and e has a result state ⋆ s in which x has y.
3 A reviewer asks about el·olvas 'read through', which is more semantically transparent than e.g. el·tűnik 'disappear' (because of the verb olvas 'read') and less transparent than e.g. hőssé válik 'turn into a hero' (where the r-state is transparently encoded by the preverb). My two points in response are: (i) el·olvas 'read through', although aspectually an accomplishment (in the sense of Vendler 1967), most likely does not encode an r-state anyway (since not all accomplishments necessarily do; see section 3 for a brief remark); (ii) but even supposing that it did, one could treat the preverb el as encoding the r-state in question, though this meaning of el would be available only in combination with olvas. 
As shown in (9), the verb first combines with the adjective zöld 'green' and then with the object a falat 'the wall.ACC' to yield a three-place relation between events e, states s, and individuals x such that x paints the wall in e and s is a result state of e in which the wall is painted green.
It may be objected that in (8) and (9), neither the translative suffix -vÁ nor the sublative suffix -rA is explicitly assigned a denotation. But observe that there is no real difficulty here: we could regard the analyses in (8a) and (9a) as derived and treat the suffix in each case as encoding result-state, as shown in (10a) and (11a). The analyses in (8a) and (9a) would then be derived by applying the relations in (10a) and (11a) to the relations between events and individuals given in (10b) and (11b), respectively.
(10) a. -vÁ 'TRAN' ; λV λ Rλ xλ sλ e. result-state(s, e, x,V, R) b. (válik-'turn-into' ;) λ xλ e. turn-into(e, x) (11) a. -rA 'SUBL' ; λV λ Rλ xλ sλ e. result-state(s, e, x,V, R) b. fest-'paint-' ; λ xλ e.paint (e, x) This strategy would be more plausible for R-rA fest-'paint-R' than for RvÁ válik-'turn-into R' because there is independently an activity verb fest-'paint', whereas válik 'turn into' (on this meaning) requires a complement ending in -vÁ 'TRAN' from the start. For this reason, it would be more apt to treat at least the analysis in (8a) as basic. 4
Temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL'
In this section, I argue that temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL' may be used to determine the duration of an r-state and that there is evidence that they have three interpretations: an actuality-based use, an intention-based use, and an incorporated use. I also argue against the claim (made by Gyuris 2003 and Kiefer 2006) that there is a special (fourth) reading of such modifiers not already covered by one of the three uses established.
The actuality-based use
A temporal modifier ending in the sublative case suffix -rA 'SUBL' may be used to specify the duration of an r-state, as already illustrated in (1a) and (2a As seen in (12), the meaning of actuality-based -ra a first applies to a predicate S of states and then to a relation N between events and states, yielding a predicate of events e such that there is a state s of type S and N holds of e and s. The third conjunct serves as a "sanity check" to ensure that s really is an r-state of e. Finally, the derivation of two particular temporal modifiers is shown in (13) and (14). The derivation of the relevant part of (1a) is as follows: 
The event predicate in (15d) denotes the set of events e such that Tigris disappears in e and there is a state s such that s is a result state of e in which Tigris is out of sight and s lasts for at least five days. 6
The intention-based use
If a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' is combined with a verb that takes a volitional argument (typically, an agent), the specified duration of the r-state need not actually hold but it may instead only be intended by the volitional participant to hold, as illustrated by the two examples in (16), which would otherwise be predicted to be contradictory. In order to account for this reading, the analysis of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL' needs to be made more complex by relativizing the specified 6 From (11a) and (12) we see that the sublative case suffix -rA 'SUBL' has at least two meanings (or, as we will soon see, arguably at least four), one for adjectives encoding rstates and another for temporal modifiers expressing the duration of r-states. A reviewer asks whether this is a coincidence. While it may not be a coincidence from a diachronic perspective, these two uses of -rA 'SUBL' are nonetheless distinct synchronically, though they are semantically related insofar as they both involve r-states. Note 
harminc percre i ki·megy-a kertbe 'go-out into the garden for thirty minutes' ; λ xλ e.∃s (result-state( s, e, x, 
The symbol ∧ in (17) stands for an abstraction operator over possible circumstances (often: worlds). Such an operator is needed here because what one intends need not ever actually be the case, the idea being that what one intends is the case in those possible circumstances compatible with one's intentions. (Note that the variable M stands for a three-place relation between events, states, and individuals.) 8 I ignore the effect of focusing the temporal modifier. In (16a) and (16b), the focus is justified by the contrast set up by the second clause. (In Hungarian, the focused constituent occupies the preverbal position, in which case the preverb-if there is one-follows the verb. The displaced preverbs in (16) are ki and el, respectively.)
In prose, the predicate in (19b) denotes a relation between events e and (volitional) individuals x such that e is an event of going by x, there is a result state s of e in which x is out in the garden, and x intends for e to have a result state s 1 in which x is out in the garden and s 1 lasts for at least thirty minutes. Note, again, that it is possible that the actual result state s of e lasts for less than thirty minutes. The question arises whether a single sentence with a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' may really have two readings, an actuality-based one and an intention-based one. Let us consider this question in connection with the following example (cf. (16a) Probably the most natural way of understanding this sentence-given that Réka is the volitional participant of the event described-is to attribute to her the intention of being out in the garden for at least thirty minutes. Suppose, furthermore, that she actually was out in the garden for thirty minutes. This fact alone does not show that the sentence in (20) also has a distinct actualitybased reading, because her actually having been out in the garden for thirty minutes is obviously compatible with her intending to be out in the garden for at least thirty minutes. In this case, it is sufficient to postulate a single reading, the intention-based one, which is compatible with the situations covered by the actuality-based reading.
In order to argue that the sentence in (20) also has an actuality-based reading, we should take care to rule out the corresponding intention-based reading. For example, a context in which Réka was out in the garden for thirty minutes but did not intend to be out in the garden for that long would still make the sentence in (20) 'Réka intentionally went out into the garden for only twenty minutes, but in the end she stayed there for thirty minutes, so in retrospect we can say that she went out into the garden for thirty minutes.'
This sentence should express a contradiction if the only reading for the final clause were an intention-based one. In this case, it should express a contradiction because Réka could not have both the intention to be out in the garden for only twenty minutes and the intention to be there for thirty minutes at the same time. On the other hand, if the final clause also has a bona fide actuality-based reading, then it would be consistent with the first clause, which obviously has an intention-based reading. Since the sentence in (21) is not contradictory, we may conclude that its final clause also has a bona fide actuality-based interpretation. 9 A reviewer suggests that although the intention-based reading requires a volitional participant, the volitional participant need not be represented as an argument of the verb. According to the reviewer, the following sentence, with the intransitive verb ki·nyílik 'out-open', also has an intention-based interpretation, which (if correct) would pose a concern for the present analysis, which takes the volitional participant to be an argument of the verb: In attempting to decide whether this sentence has a bona fide intention-based reading, it is useful to bear in mind the distinction between "natural inferences" and semantic content. Given that doors are typically opened by volitional agents, it is natural to infer that in (22) as well, there was an agent who was responsible for the opening of the door and who intended for the door to be open for thirty minutes. But even if this natural inference is drawn, it does not follow that the sentence in (22) has a semantically encoded intentionbased reading. (The availability of an actuality-based reading is not in dispute.)
By applying the pattern illustrated in (16), we can construct an argument against the claim that the sentence in (22) has a bona fide intention-based reading, because the following sentence is judged to be contradictory: (23) From the present perspective, the contrast in acceptability between (23) and (16) is sufficient for the argument against the view that the sentence in (22) has a bona fide intention-based reading, but at the same time it must be conceded that there may be creative ways of understanding (23) as expressing a consistent proposition. 10
The incorporated use
The two interpretations of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL' discussed thus far, the actuality-based use and the intention-based use, arguably do not cover all of the relevant data. Consider the following examples, which at first glance seem to be canonical instances of the intention-based use: (24) In (24a), Réka invited Tamás for three days, but whether Tamás actually stayed with Réka for three days or even visited her at all is left open, hence this appears to be a prime example of the intention-based use of három napra 'three day.SUBL'. The worry, though, is that the temporal modifier in this case does not really modify the r-state of meg·hív 'invite'. To see this, let us briefly consider what the r-state of meg·hív 'invite' as illustrated in (24a) plausibly is. If Réka invites Tamás for three days, then Tamás has an invitation from Réka to stay with her for three days. Note, crucially, that this is not the same as Tamás's having an invitation from Réka for three days to stay with her, i.e., in the former case, the three days applies to how long he stays with her and not to how long he has the invitation, which may well be significantly longer, e.g., until he (positively or negatively) acts on the invitation. If correct, then the r-state of meg·hív 'invite' is that the invitee has an invitation from the inviter to do something (in (24a), to stay with the inviter), and yet it is not the having of an invitation that the temporal modifier applies to but rather it is the content of the invitation that is pertinent. More informally, in the case of meg·hív 'invite', a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' applies to a state "within" the r-state as opposed to the r-state itself.
The other examples in (24) seem to be similar in this respect. In (24b), for instance, the r-state of ki·ad 'rent out' is that the renter has a contract from the owner to stay in the property in question during the term of the contract. The temporal modifier tíz hónapra 'ten month.SUBL' applies not to how long the renter has the contract from the owner but rather to how long the renter may stay in the property. In other words, the temporal modifier applies to a state that is part of the content of the contract and not to the having of the contract.
Unfortunately, if this reasoning is correct, it is not feasible to account for this use of a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' as an instance of either the actuality-based reading or the intention-based reading. I will call this new use of a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' the incorporated use, the main idea being that the modifier is semantically incorporated in this case. In what follows, I sketch a treatment of (24a), well aware that there are a number of details that I cannot address adequately here.
The analysis of meg·hív 'invite' is shown in (25), where the subcategorization frame indicates that meg·hív 'invite' takes both an NP that is [ 
The meaning of meg·hív 'invite', a four-place relation between an event e, an individual x (the inviter), an individual y (the invitee), and a predicate S of states, affirms that x invites y in e and there is a result state ⋆ s of e in which y has an invitation from x with the content that there is a state s ′′ in which y stays with x for the time specified by S. Observe that the operator ∧ is employed before the content of the invitation because y need not ever actually stay with x for the period determined by S. Indeed, y need not ever actually stay with x at all: whether y does depends on whether y positively acts on the invitation from x. The incorporated use of -rA 'SUBL' is shown in (26a), which applies to a predicate S of states (syntactically, an NP that is [+temporal] ), e.g., the one in (26b), to yield the same predicate of states but with the additional syntactic feature [+subl] , as seen in (26c). (26) 
In prose, this event predicate denotes the set of events e such that Réka invites Tamás in e and there is a result state ⋆ s of e in which Tamás has an invitation from Réka to stay with her for three days. Importantly, the state s ′′ in which Tamás stays with Réka is not the same as the result state ⋆ s in which Tamás has an invitation from Réka. Rather, the former is part of the content of the latter (the invitation). Given the analysis of meg·hív 'invite' proposed in (25), observe that neither the actuality-based use of -rA 'SUBL' (see (12)) nor its intention-based use (see (17)) is applicable. This is because the result state ⋆ s of meg·hív 'invite' is already existentially quantified over and so is not available for further modification. The only way for meg·hív 'invite' to combine with a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' is by applying to an instance of the incorporated use.
We can argue that the sentence in (24a) in fact lacks an actuality-based reading by pointing out that the following sentence is contradictory (cf. (21) Although it is not clear why Tamás stayed with Réka for an extra three days, we cannot conclude from the fact that he stayed with her longer that her invitation was for six days instead of the original three. It may be that Réka extended her original invitation at some point during the first three days of Tamás's stay, but this is not a conclusion that we can necessarily draw. It may be that Réka simply tolerated his staying with her for three extra days. In sum, the mere fact that Tamás stayed with Réka for six days does not allow us to conclude that she invited him for six days, hence the sentence in (24a) lacks an actuality-based reading.
By contrast, the sentence in (24a) does very well have an "intentionbased" reading in the sense that invitations are intentional, a point that would be rendered more explicit in a more detailed analysis. At the same time, we cannot speak of the intention-based use of -rA 'SUBL' here, because the intentionality originates in the meaning of meg·hív 'invite' and not in the meaning of the temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL'. This claim is supported by the following contrast (pointed out to me by Gyuri Rákosi): In both (29a) and (29b), the adverb véletlenül 'accidentally' associates with the temporal adverbial ending in -rA 'SUBL', and yet the sentence in (29a) is acceptable, whereas the one in (29b) is not (the intention-based use of the temporal adverbial is the relevant reading in the latter). The idea is that, in (29b), the meaning of véletlenül 'accidentally' contradicts the intention-based use of the temporal adverbial ending in -rA 'SUBL', which explicitly makes reference to the agent's intention, whereas in (29a), there is no contradiction because it is the incorporated use and not the intention-based use of the temporal adverbial ending in -rA 'SUBL' that is at stake. In (29a), Réka intentionally invites Tamás (since invitations are intentional), but she makes a mistake on the content of the invitation, not intending to invite him for three days. This does not result in a contradiction because the incorporated use of a temporal adverbial ending in -rA 'SUBL' does not make reference to the agent's intention.
A fourth use?
Gyuris ( 12 The mere fact that temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL' are compatible with such existential constructions does not necessarily show that there is a special use of these temporal modifiers, a so-called existential reading or a goal adverbial sense. There may be such a special use of such modifiers, but to establish this requires argument. As far as I can tell, neither Gyuris nor Kiefer has made a case for such a special use (and, if I may 11 I set aside Gyuris's claim (present in the quotation) that the so-called existential reading of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL' does not require the r-state to be reversible, because she does not actually argue for it (and yet the truth of the claim is not self-evident). In any case, reversibility as a semantic condition also is not self-evident-see sect. 3.1.
12 Although this is likely for (30a) and (30c), it is much less likely for (30b). At any rate, even if (30b) contains an existential construction, it is not the same kind of existential construction as in (30a) add, neither seems to be especially interested in this use, because they both immediately set it aside).
From the present perspective, the question is whether the data in (30) require us to postulate a fourth use of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL', in addition to the actuality-based use and the intention-based use. (I assume that the incorporated use is not at issue in (30).) As long as an existential construction offers a modifiable r-state, the actuality-based reading or the intention-based reading of a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' should in principle be available-the "source" of the r-state is immaterial from the perspective of such modifiers.
In what follows, I will sketch a partial analysis of the sentence in (30a), treating it as containing an existential construction. Since the external argument of főz 'cook' denotes a volitional participant (an agent), I assume that the intention-based use of -rA 'SUBL' is the prominent one here, so I will focus on this reading.
The verb főz 'cook' (as an existential verb) is analyzed as in (31), where P is a predicate of individuals. It denotes a four-place relation between events e, states s, (volitional) individuals x, and predicates P such that x cooks something in e and s is a result-state • of e in which there is something of type P that is available. Recall from (5) 
Since the internal argument of főz 'cook' is a predicate of individuals, it has to be fed such an argument:
Once the relation in (31) is applied to the predicate in (32), we obtain the following relation:
The analysis of the temporal modifier három napra 'three day.SUBL' on its intention-based use is given in (34), which is obtained by applying the relation in (17) 
In prose, this is a two-place relation between events e and (volitional) individuals x such that x cooks something in e and there is a state s that is a result state • of e in which there is some food available and x intends for there to be a state s ′′ that is a result state • of e in which there is some food available and which lasts for three days. Note, again, that since the temporal specification applies to the intended result state • s ′′ of e, the actual result state • s of e need not last for three days. If the partial analysis that I have sketched of the sentence in (30a) reasonably reflects its meaning, then it is hard to see the motivation for a fourth use of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL', despite what Gyuris and Kiefer claim. Thus, in the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, the present conclusion is that the sentences in (30) do not provide evidence for a fourth use of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL'.
Comparisons
The account advocated in this paper is not the only one that has been proposed of result states 13 in Hungarian. In this section, I critically review two other approaches that I am aware of, that of Kiefer (2006) 14 and that of BendeFarkas (2007) .
Kiefer (2006)
Kiefer adopts Pustejovsky's (1991) framework and proposes (sect. 4.4) that result states 15 be represented in "event structure" as states that follow punctual events or processes. For example, el·megy 'leave' ('away-go') and meg·ír 'write' ('PREV-write') are said to have the following schematic event structures (where PUNCTUAL, PROCESS, and STATE are to be instantiated by specific predicates appropriate for the verb in question): 16 (36) a. el·megy 'PREV-leave': (Cf. Kiefer's (47), p. 229) PUNCTUAL(x, e 1 ) < STATE(x, e 2 ) b. meg·ír 'PREV-write': (Cf. Kiefer's (30d), p. 222) PROCESS (x, y, e 1 ) < STATE(y, e 2 )
Let me immediately point out-if only to immediately set it aside-that merely saying that some state e 2 involving x temporally follows some punctual event or process e 1 involving x still falls significantly short of an adequate characterization of what a result state is. Like Pustejovsky, Kiefer assumes (pp. 249-250) that all accomplishments encode a result state in their event structure, 17 an assumption that Gyuris (p. 22) also makes. By contrast, in the approach that I have adopted, this assumption is not made, the view being that some (perhaps even many) but not all accomplishments encode result states. This is a significant theoretical difference: whereas Pustejovsky, Kiefer, and Gyuris take it to be definitional of what an accomplishment is that it have a result state, I take it to be an empirical issue whether a particular accomplishment has a result state or not. Although I cannot embark on a discussion of this difference here, I would simply point out that there are well-known approaches to aspectual composition such as Krifka (1992) and Verkuyl (1993) that treat accomplishments without the notion of a result state, and that the assumption that every accomplishment encodes a result state can easily become dogmatic if it is not said, in the case of a particular accomplishment, what exactly the result state is.
Kiefer (p. 240) introduces two predicates into event structure, REV (for reversible) and CONTROL (for control), in order to be able to say that a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' is compatible with a result state e if e is characterized as reversible (REV(e)) or as controlled by an individual (typically, 15 Kiefer uses at least three Hungarian terms for what I call result states-utóállapot 'poststate', végállapot 'end-state', and eredményállapot 'result state'-but as far as I can tell, he uses them interchangeably. 16 Note that Kiefer employs the same kind of variables for both events and states.
17
Though how accomplishments that are derived compositionally suddenly acquire a result state is not clear in Kiefer's approach. For example, an accomplishment with portalanít 'dust' should encode a result state, but since there is no result state in the lexical entry of portalanít 'dust', which Kiefer assumes is an activity verb, it is mysterious how a result state suddenly appears in the course of a derivation (see pp. 215, 222-223). an agent) x (CONTROL(x, e) ). This is illustrated in (37) Since the event structure for (37a) in (37b) includes the condition that e 2 is reversible, a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' may be acceptably applied.
In the case of events with an agent, Kiefer claims that the presence of CONTROL is the crucial element for the acceptability of a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL'. However, since he postulates ((61), p. 233) that control of a state e by x implies that e is reversible (his formal statement is: CONTROL(x, e) → REV(e)), it would be more economical to get rid of the disjunctive condition (p. 240) for compatibility with a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' (namely, that the result state should be reversible or controlled), and instead simply say that the result state should be reversible. In other words, since control entails reversibility, it is redundant to stipulate the disjunctive condition of control or reversibility because it would suffice to stipulate reversibility alone. 18 The difficulty with Kiefer's notion of reversibility is that not only is it not defined or characterized in any way but also its logical type is incorrect. It does not make much sense to ask of an individual state e whether it is reversible or not (see e.g. (37b)). Since any individual state e holds only once, e is never reversible. If, for example, e is a state in which a particular lake is frozen, e may cease to hold at some point but e, that particular individual state, cannot be "reversed." In other words, the notion of reversibility is not successfully captured as a one-place predicate of individual states.
If one insisted on adding a notion of reversibility to result states as a condition for the successful application of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL', a notion that interfaces well with the approach that I have proposed could be defined as follows: 19
In prose, we may say s is reversible with respect to x and R just in case R holds of s and x and it is possible that there is a time t later than the time of s and t is not a part of the time of a state s ′ such that R holds of s ′ and x. In other words, and more informally, s is reversible with respect to x and R just in case R may cease to hold of s and x at some point.
A reversible result state would then be defined as the conjunction of the notion of a result state with that of being reversible: 20
But even with the notion of a reversible result state in hand, it is arguably an undesirable complication to stipulate reversibility as a semantic condition for compatibility with temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL'. On the contrary, reversibility is best regarded as an implicature of the use of such modifiers (and, more specifically, of numeral phrases). For example, if két hétre 'two week.SUBL' is predicated of a result state, as in (37a), the implicature is that the result state ceases to hold after two weeks (in other words, the implicature is that the result state is reversible), for otherwise the speaker should have chosen to specify a different duration. If this reasoning is correct, then it is difficult to justify building a reversibility condition into the semantics of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL'.
In conclusion, even putting aside any worries about the vagaries of semantic composition in a Pustejovsky-style framework, 21 Kiefer's account is problematic because it says very little about what a result state is and offers no definition or characterization of reversibility, while at the same time attributing to it an incorrect logical type, and yet reversibility plays a crucial role in his (otherwise largely implicit) treatment of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL'.
Bende-Farkas (2007)
One of Bende-Farkas's main concerns is to argue (p. 55) that "the best method of semantic composition for resultatives involves dynamic semantics with asymmetric merge." To put it another way, the idea is that a predicate denoting a result state is (dynamically) asymmetrically merged with a verbal 20 For completeness, it would ultimately also be necessary to define variants of reversibility for the notions of result state ⋆ and result state • , respectively.
21 Kiefer (p. 238) claims that a (neo-)Davidsonian event semantic approach is not suitable "for the identification of result states" ("az utóállapot azonosítására"), but without further qualification, this claim is a bit misleading. Obviously, in a trivial sense, any event semantic approach without result states will have difficulties in "the identification of result states," but there is no reason why result states cannot be added to a (neo-)Davidsonian event semantic approach. (One such attempt is in Piñón 1999.) predicate. A couple of analyses of result state predicates offered by BendeFarkas are as follows (where E is a dynamic existential quantifier): (40) In (40a), appeal is made to a function Res that "encodes the end state conventionally associated with the event described by the complex verb" (fn. 1, p. 58). According to Bende-Farkas, no such appeal is necessary for the treatment of the result state predicate red-/ 0, as seen in (40b). 22 Although Bende-Farkas provides a nice comparative linguistic review of resultatives, at least three points are not so clear about the analysis that she sketches in (40).
First, it is not obvious how the function Res relates to Cause. Indeed, even if Res is taken to be primitive, it would be useful to have some kind of characterization of it, given its prominent role.
Second, it is a bit difficult to appreciate the radical difference in the treatment of pirosra 'red.SUBL' versus red-/ 0. Bende-Farkas says that there is a difference between Hungarian fest 'paint', which lacks a result state in its lexical entry, and English paint, which may have a result state in its entry on its telic reading, hence pirosra 'red.SUBL' (in contrast to red-/ 0) adds a result state. But why could red-/ 0 not also add a result state to the atelic reading of paint? And what would happen if we tried to merge red-/ 0 with the atelic reading of paint nonetheless? 23 Finally, seeing that many resultative predicates in Hungarian (e.g., pirosra 'red.SUBL') function as preverbs and consequently typically appear before the verb (e.g., pirosra fest 'paint red'), one wonders why verbal predicates should not preferably be asymmetrically merged with resultative predicates rather than the other way around (at least in such cases).
To conclude, let me acknowledge that Bende-Farkas may be right that asymmetric merge in a dynamic semantics is ultimately the preferred way to handle semantic composition, but this is a general theoretical and methodological point, having little to do with resultatives per se (resultatives would simply count as a special instance of asymmetric merge). At the same time, as a concrete analysis of result states in Hungarian, Bende-Farkas's account is significantly incomplete and still needs to address the kinds of issues that are addressed by Gyuris (2003) , Kiefer (2006) , and in the account that I have proposed. 24
Potential empirical problems
Sometimes adding a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' yields an unacceptable result. To account for this, both Gyuris (2003) and Kiefer (2006) claim that the semantics of such modifiers has to make reference to such notions as "control" and "reversibility," as already touched upon in sect. 3.1. As Kiefer (p. 240) puts it: "A temporal modifier ending in -rA is only applicable if the result state is further characterized by either the predicate CONTROL(x, e) or REV(e)" ["[A] -rA ragos időmódosító akkor alkalmazható, ha az utóállapot vagy a KONTROLL(x, e) vagy a REV(e) predikátummal egészül ki"].
Recall (also from sect. 3.1) that although we could build a reversibility requirement into the semantics of temporal modifiers ending in -rA 'SUBL', a more attractive option would be to try to model the "reversibility effect" as a pragmatic implicature. Nevertheless, there is still potentially a role for semantics because in the present approach, it is not a matter of definition that every accomplishment entails a result state, hence insofar as we attempt to combine a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' with an accomplishment that lacks a result state, we should get an unacceptable result.
In this section, I examine three problematic verbs among five that Gyuris (p. 28) diagnoses as entailing result states that are neither reversible nor controlable. 25 
ki·vasal 'out-iron'
What is the problem (if there is one) with the following sentence? 24 I do not mean to imply that Bende-Farkas's account could not be adequately fleshed out. Rather, in its present form, it just seems to be significantly incomplete. 25 The two other verbs in this class are meg·mos 'PREV-wash' and meg·ír 'PREV-write'. Again, just to recall from sect. 3.1, since control of a state e is said (implicitly by Gyuris, explicitly by Kiefer) to imply that e is reversible, it would be sufficient to speak of result states that are not reversible.
Intuitively, the result state of an ironing out 26 event is a state in which (the contextually relevant part of) the thing ironed is free of creases. If correct, then there should not be a semantic problem with (41), because I may have had reason to believe that my clothes would need to be ironed again an hour later. In practice, of course, such a situation is unlikely to arise. ) disagrees with the intuition that an ironing out event results in no creases. She instead offers the following explanation of the unacceptability of the sentence in (41):
The key to the solution is that although the goal of an ironing event is generally that the ironed thing not be creased, it is not the case for every ironing that this is the consequence. At the same time, at the end of an ironing event it is always possible to say that the thing in question is ironed out, which is thus qualitatively another state than the state where the clothes are not creased. One cannot intentionally put an end to the state where a thing is ironed out [. . . ] .
[A megoldás kulcsa az, hogy bár a vasalási esemény célja álta-lában az, hogy a kivasalt dolog ne legyen gyűrött, nem minden vasalásra igaz, hogy ez be is következik. Egy vasalási esemény végén ugyanakkor mindig elmondható, hogy az adott dolog ki van vasalva, ami tehát minőségileg más állapot, mint az az álla-pot, hogy a ruha nem gyűrött. Annak az állapotnak, hogy egy dolog ki van vasalva [. . . ] nem lehet szándékosan véget vetni.] Unfortunately, this passage is a bit misleading because of a confounding of ironing (vasalási) events with ironing out (kivasalási) events. Contrary to what Gyuris says, ironing (vasalási) events do not always have a result state in which the thing ironed is ironed out (ki van vasalva). If we correct this and focus instead on ironing out (kivasalási) events, then we might attempt to say (in the spirit of Gyuris) that the result state of an ironing out (kivasalási) event is a state in which the thing ironed is ironed out (ki van vasalva), but this claim has nontrivial content to the extent to which we can say what such states are like. But now the difficulty is that, according to Gyuris, looking for no creases will not help because a state in which something is ironed out (ki van vasalva) is "qualitatively another state" from one in which the thing ironed is not creased. So what characterizes a state in which something is ironed out (ki van vasalva)? Unfortunately, to answer that it is ironed out (ki van vasalva) which it suffices to iron (or more colloquially: to run an iron over) the surface of the contextually relevant part of a piece of clothing with no guarantee that that part will be free of creases afterwards. (Arguably, on this reading of ki·vasal 'iron (out)', the use of a cold iron would suffice!) This may be the sense that Gyuris has in mind in the passage cited above, and the sentence in (41) is indeed unacceptable on this meaning of ki·vasal 'iron (out)'. However, the reason that she gives for the unacceptability is nonetheless still mistaken, because on this meaning of ki·vasal 'iron (out)', there is no result state: the event ends when all of the surface of the relevant part of the piece of clothing is ironed. But if there is no result state, then there is no result state for a temporal modifier ending in -rA 'SUBL' to modify. From the present perspective, this is all there is to say. In particular, there is no need to postulate (as Gyuris does) a mysterious result state of being ironed out (ki van vasalva) that is irreversible and that merely serves to redescribe what happened.
be·bizonyít 'PREV-prove'
Finally, consider the following unacceptable sentence: If Réka proves the theorem in question, then she produces a proof of the theorem. (There may be more than one proof of the theorem.) The result state is that there is a proof of the theorem. But once there is a proof of the theorem, there will always be a proof of the theorem, so this is a result state that lasts forever. The use of két hétre 'two week. SUBL' in (44) implicates that the result state ended after two weeks. But since this cannot be the case here, the use of két hétre 'two week.SUBL' yields a contradictory flavor. If we were nonetheless forced to interpret the sentence in (44), it would seem to imply that there was a critical mistake in the proof-in which case Réka did not really prove the theorem to begin with-and that it was shown that the proof was faulty after two weeks.
